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June 2005 was the month of pilkada, local elections, in seven provinces and 159 
towns and kabupaten (districts) all over Indonesia.2 For the first time in history, 
Indonesian citizens could elect their own district head, mayor, or governor directly. It 
was the most recent step in the process of decentralization, and one of the most 
remarkable powers that Indonesia's central government surrendered to the regions 
since 1999.3 The Indonesian weekly news magazine, Tempo, wrote in its special issue on 
these elections
For many people this is a cause for cheer: now is the time for people to speak out 
and choose their leaders themselves. Others are horrified to see the negative 
excesses of local elections: clashes between supporters, money politics, and the 
emergence of antagonistic figures. Excesses are inevitable, but general elections 
are better than none at all. Without pilkada, corrupt leaders, their money politics,
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and conflicts remain. Times have changed—the era when regional leaders were 
assigned by Jakarta has ended. Now is the moment for people to speak.4
This quote is far more optimistic concerning the possibilities for the establishment 
of democracy within Indonesia than recent academic literature, for in academic 
literature the general conclusion up to 2004 seems to be that old political- 
administrative elites have effectively remained in control. Vedi Hadiz argued that "old 
predatory interests incubated under the New Order's vast system of patronage have 
successfully reconstituted themselves within the new [democratic] regime. Through 
new alliances, they have effectively captured the institutions of democracy."5 
Judgments such as these prompt us to ask whether the established elites and interests 
will also be able to get voted in as bupati, governor, or mayor in the new decentralized 
districts and provinces.
The type of decentralization currently underway in Indonesia is a devolution of 
administrative power to the kabupaten that is heavily subsidized by the central 
government, which has maintained its control over the main sources of revenue in the 
regions.6 The central government keeps 75 percent of these revenues and distributes 
the other 25 percent to the regions in the form of a general grant, Dana Alokasi Umum 
(DAU, General Allocation Fund). The district government—made up of the bupati and 
the local assembly—has autonomous authority over spending this budget. With 
enhanced regional autonomy and the increased budget, the position of bupati has 
become very attractive.
The most significant innovation affecting the 2005 pilkada is that bupatis and mayors 
are no longer chosen by local assembly members, but directly by the voters. The 
question for those aspiring to be bupati is no longer how to win the support of 
assembly members, but how to win the votes of the electorate. So it becomes important 
to investigate the candidates' election campaign strategies under these new conditions. 
Do the entrenched political-administrative elites succeed in capturing this latest 
institution of democracy, too, or does a direct election open up opportunities for new 
candidates? These are central question for this article, which can only be answered by 
empirical research. This article contributes to the documentation of and debate on the 
development of democracy in Indonesia by examining the case of pilkada in East 
Sumba.
The island of Sumba is part of the province of East Nusa Tenggara, which is the 
poorest province in Indonesia. Sumba itself consists of two districts, East and West, 
with 193,000 and 367,000 inhabitants (in 2002) respectively.7 Agriculture is the main 
source of living for 85 percent of the Sumbanese working population, including real 
farmers, but also many people who have no better alternative—even in spite of their 
secondary schooling or university diploma—than to work in their gardens and fields
4 Tempo, June 13, 2005, p. 12.
5 Vedi Hadiz, "Power and Politics in North Sumatera: The Uncompleted Reformasi," in Local Power and 
Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, ed. E. Aspinall and G. Fealy (Singapore: ISEAS, 
2003), p. 119.
6Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, "Introduction," in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics 
in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, ed. H. Schulte Nordholt and G. van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, forthcoming 
2006).
7 Data from "Sumba Barat in Figures 2002" and "Sumba Timur in Figures 2002" of the Badan Pusat 
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and say that they are tani.8 The dream of educated, but underemployed, workers is to 
secure a paid government position. Those Sumbanese who have succeeded in gaining 
government employment redistribute a large part of their income to relatives, thus 
serving as their source of social security. Sumbanese bupatis control the population's 
major job opportunities: they decide in tender procedures for public investments, act as 
the authority issuing licenses, and control the allocation of the regional budget. Pilkada 
was therefore extremely important in Sumba.
District Head Election Procedures
The idea to have direct elections of regional9 heads of government emerged as part 
of the revisions of Law 22 of 1999 on decentralization in 2004. The revised Law, 
number 34 of 2004, effectuated in September, also said in section 233 that in all regions 
where the current term of the district head (bupati), mayor, or governor would end 
before June 2005, direct elections would be held in June 2005. Both West and East 
Sumba are included in this category, which ultimately comprised a total of 159 districts 
and cities, and seven provinces. The date for the elections on Sumba was set for June 
30, 2005.
During the New Order period, regional heads had been proposed by the regional 
assembly, but appointed by the Minister of Domestic Affairs in Jakarta. Since the 
regional autonomy period started in 1999, members of the local assembly (DPRD, 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's Representative Assembly) have 
been given the authorization to elect the regional head. This action gave the members 
of these assemblies power over their region's head of government. Before the election, 
candidates had to win the assembly members' votes, and that dependence fostered 
corruption. Former Minister Ryaas Rasyid concludes that, since 1999, almost all 
regional heads of government elections have been associated with "money politics," 
but that the allegations concerning this type of corruption have never been proven.10 
Although this phenomenon is widely known, it seems to have resulted in no negative 
consequences for the perpetrators. Nankyung Choi discusses the role of "money 
politics" in an article on the 2001 Yogyakarta mayoral election.11 The term "money 
politics," according to Choi, "is preferred by many Indonesians, including scholars and 
even ordinary citizens, to differentiate from the corruption of the authoritarian past."12 
Since decentralization policy brought power—and funds—to the districts, local 
assemblies have emerged as "the new locus for money politics."13 Choi argues that
legal restraints regarding the practices of "money politics" still play a negligible 
role and, more significantly, many local party politicians have shown an
8 Tani means farmer, and respondents in a census who are registered as tani make up the category of the 
working population occupied in the agricultural sector.
9 The term "regional" is used here as a translation of daerah, which can refer both to the provincial level 
(daerah tinkat 1, propinsi) and the district level (daerah tingkat 2, kabupaten).
10 Ryaas Rasyid, "Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia," in Local Power and Politics in 
Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, ed. E. Aspinall and G. Fealy (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003),
p. 66.
11 Nyankung Choi, "Local Elections and Party Politics in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: A View from 
Yogyakarta," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26,2 (2004): 280-301.
12 Ibid., p. 280.
13 Ibid., p. 296.
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inclination to equate their expanded power with correspondingly increased 
financial rewards.14
The new system of direct elections has turned the candidates' attention from 
assembly members toward the electorate, on the one hand, and to the central and 
regional boards of political parties, on the other. People who want to become 
candidates have to take four preparatory steps. Firstly, they have to find a political 
party that will nominate them as an aspirant candidate. Only the political parties that 
hold seats in the regional assembly are authorized to nominate candidates for regional 
head. For a single nomination, support of at least 15 percent of the assembly seats is 
required, which makes it necessary for small parties to form a coalition. Secondly, the 
political party will create pairs of candidates—a regional head and his deputy— 
because only pairs can enter the elections. Thirdly, the political party's board will 
choose between aspiring pairs and select only one of them to stand as the final 
candidates. Fourthly, each pair will have to pass the screening of the general election 
committee (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum) to make sure that they meet all criteria 
outlined in section 58 of Law 32 of 2004. These criteria refer to, among other issues, the 
candidate's health, age, and educational level, his or her criminal record, and his or her 
reputation and knowledge of the region. The candidates also have to submit an 
overview of their personal assets and wealth to the General Election Committee and 
agree that they will raise no objection to these data being published. Finally, they have 
to obey the procedural election rules, which require, for instance, that they submit their 
nomination on time and refrain from engaging in campaign activities before the official 
campaign period, which is scheduled only fourteen days prior to election day, with a 
rest of three days in between.
Money politics in these elections involve payments to the political party boards to 
assure their willingness to support certain candidates. A newspaper editorial 
commented that this practice is more and more regarded as a standard "political cost," 
giving such bribes a more acceptable and neutral name.15 To raise these fund, every 
candidate is surrounded by investors, who are euphemistically called members of the 
success teams (tim sukses). Political parties generally create campaign teams to assist 
the candidates in their election campaigns. In Indonesia, Golkar is the most successful 
party in that respect, since "it is still the best organized political machine—it had 
thirty-two years of history and is much better off than other parties financially."16
Once a pair's official candidacy is assured, they will divert their attention to the 
electorate. The challenge is how to shape their political identity in a way that will 
attract as many votes as possible.
Previous Election Strategies and Voting Behavior
Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth have published a qualitative study comparing 
voting behavior during the last New Order elections in 1997 with behavior during the
14 Ibid., p. 297.
15 Max Regus, "Pilkada, kapitalisasi politik dan banditisasi kekuasaan," Pos Kupang, April 15, 2005, 
http: / / www.indomedia.com/ poskup/ 2005/ 04 /15 / edisil5/ 1504pinl.htm, accessed on May 25, 2005.
16 Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 
p. 207.
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first free elections in the post-Suharto era, in 1999.17 They highlight how intense 
political rivalries at the local level in the 1997 elections were surprisingly similar to 
rivalries during the elections under the more democratic government in 1999. 
Cederroth argues in his chapter on Lombok that the type of power struggles 
characteristic of traditional petty kingdoms have been perpetuated, now in the guise of 
modern political parties. Cederroth concludes that
there is one factor which takes precedence above everything else when 
determining political loyalties—and that is the tendency for people to associate 
themselves with a locally important person, to become part of his following. In 
fact, the political system can be seen as consisting of layers of patrons and their 
clients in concentric but also overlapping circles—from petty officials on the 
hamlet level all the way up through the village, the subdistrict, the district, and 
the provincial levels.18
Cederroth apparently concludes that any candidate who could claim traditional 
authority combined with membership in one of the largest political parties—primarily 
Golkar—had sufficient clout to be recognized as a "locally important person." 
Candidates need knowledge of local culture to find the most successful formula to be 
regarded as a rewarding patron. They can either act as traditional leaders, or shape 
modern political identities by publicizing their affiliation with certain religious or 
ethnic groups. A third possible strategy is to apply "money politics" to the electorate. 
Buying votes directly, or buying sympathy, distributing "gifts," creating reciprocal 
obligations or promising rewards in the future, all fit within the spectrum covered by 
the term "money politics." In the following cases from Sumba, I will explore these 
various options and assess candidates in terms of their respective performances as a 
(quasi-) traditional leader and/or as a modern leader, and will consider each 
candidate's reputation—as long as hard evidence is not available—as a champion or 
critic of "money politics."
Candidates
There were four pairs of candidates involved in the June 2005 elections to select a 
regional head in East Sumba. In both East and West Sumba (in West Sumba, five pairs 
of aspirants were competing for election), the candidates could generally be 
categorized in this way: first, there was the incumbent bupati, second, the incumbent 
deputy (wakil bupati), third, the main rival of the incumbents, and fourth, one or more 
outsiders. In the previous term, 1999-2005, the bupati and his deputy were members of 
different political parties, reflecting the division of seats in the local assembly. Because 
now political parties proposed candidates in pairs, the incumbent bupati and his 
deputy were rivals in the 2005 pilkada. In both districts, the main rivals of the 
incumbents were politicians who had attempted to win the district head position in 
previous terms as well. The outsiders were politicians of Sumbanese origin who had 
successfully pursued a career outside Sumba, in Kupang or on Java, in the bureaucracy 
or in business. They now felt attracted to their home island's top governmental
17 Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth, eds., Elections in Indonesia: The New Order and Beyond (London and 
New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004).
18 Ibid., p. 104.
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position, which provides high local status and a financially rewarding position. See 
chart below for a list of candidates.
All the candidates originated from Sumba, had university degrees, had pursued a 
successful career, were modern Indonesian citizens, and were Christians, as are the 
majority of residents on Sumba. The candidates differed in age, style, and in their 
professional positions. They could also be distinguished from one another in terms of 
traditional leadership criteria, according to their areas of origin, and by how voters on 
Sumba assessed them in terms of the benefits they would bring to the region and to the 
particular voters themselves.
The candidates' strategies differed according to their position or standing in this 
election. The incumbents tended to stress their successes during the previous term of 
office; the incumbent bupati could make greater claims in this regard than his deputy. 
They also represented the vested interests, promising stability—continuity with the 
previous term—and therefore, implicitly, little change. The rivals, whether old or new, 
resorted to opposition strategies. They had to show how the incumbents had failed in 
certain areas and had to be able to demonstrate how they themselves would manage to 
derive the legitimacy of their leadership from sources other than the complex of vested 
interests and entrenched local bureaucracy. The rivals relied more than the incumbent 
bupati on their appeal as traditional leaders, on their personal charisma, or on their 
capacity to be innovative leaders.
List of Candidates in East Sumba's 2005 Pilkada
no. Candidate for 





1 Drs. Lukas Mbadi 
Kaborang
Main rival of the incumbent bupati in 
previous term (1995-1999)
PPDK Lukman
Ir. Emanuel Babu 
Eha
Incumbent deputy
2 Drs. Langu  
Pindingara
Outsider, bureaucrat on Java, associated 
with business
PKPI PinRef
Drs. Refafi Gah Previous member of provincial parliament 
in Kupang
3 Ir. Um bu Mehang 
Kunda
Incumbent bupati Golkar MeGi
Drs. Gidion Mbilijora Local bureaucrat, bupati's staff member
4 Dr. Alphonsius 
Anapaku
Outsider, specialist medical doctor in 
Kupang
PDI-P Sius
Ir. Ignasius Kalukur 
Lidjang,
Outsider, technical specialist in Kupang
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Tradition and the Legitimacy of Contemporary Leadership
Following Cederroth's conclusion on leadership in Lombok, we note that in 
Sumba, too, people apparently are inclined to join the following of a powerful patron. 
Therefore, an aspiring district head should fit the local image of a powerful patron. 
Power refers to the ability to control and use human resources, material resources, and 
"ideational resources," including ideology, symbols, and information employed by 
leaders to convince others of the legitimacy of their authority and thereby enhance the 
leader's ability to acquire additional material and human resources.19 Ambitious 
politicians use these resources and manipulate the process to acquire more such 
resources, aiming ultimately to acquire more power. Webb Keane clarified the exact 
shape of these resources on Sumba, when he described the popular perception of 
leaders (nobles, maramba) in Central Sumba:
When people talk about nobles, they often talk about their wealth and, by 
extension, their generosity and protectiveness—and their danger when angered. 
... The activities that most distinguish a noble in practice—setting up great 
tombs, holding feasts, maintaining dependents, negotiating dynastic alliances, 
and sponsoring the marriages of others—require not only supporters but wealth 
as well.20
The supporters mentioned in the quote above are people who benefit from the 
noble's generosity and protection, including those who are dependent on the noble, 
receive material contributions to and help for their ceremonies, and are invited to 
attend the noble's feasts and be a member of his group. The activities mentioned here 
all belong to traditional life on Sumba. Most of the candidates in the June 2005 elections 
still gathered supporters by promising to fulfill these roles. Watching the election 
campaigns in June 2005 in Sumba, an observer might conclude that each candidate's 
main strategy was to outbluff the others through the sheer numbers of people 
attending his campaign events, as the crowds numbered between a thousand and 
twenty thousand people per event. Supporters are the human resources of power; no 
leader can do without a constituency; and voters are necessary if one seeks to be 
elected bupati.
Whether a candidate is considered suitable to be regional head is also a matter of 
his traditional identity. This identity depends on a person's position in traditional 
kinship structures, his social rank, and his traditional domain of origin.21 Kinship 
structures along the patrilineal line compose hierarchies within a domain, with layers 
delineated according to rank. The highest position is that of nobility, and within the 
nobility, the most powerful position is accorded to the oldest of brothers within a 
House who can trace the shortest blood connection to the main founding father. Lower 
members of the same hierarchy form the natural constituency of the leader. The map
19 Donald V. Kurtz, Political Anthropology: Paradigms and Power (Boulder, CO, and Oxford: Westview Press, 
2001), p. 31.
20 Webb Keane, Signs o f Recognition: Power and Hazards o f Representation in an Indonesian Society (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 58.
21 Rodney Needham describes the characteristics of a domain on Sumba: "The integrating force within a 
domain is the hegemony of the main village and of the leading clan of that village. This clan owed its 
power to its ancestral spirits, and the unity of the district or domain was manifested in the attendance at 
sacrifices and ceremonies performed at the main village by the dominant clan." Rodney Needham, 
Mamboru: History and Structure in a Domain o f Northwestern Sumba (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 6-8.
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below shows the traditional petty kingdoms in Sumba that the colonial government 
united in 1920 to form seven subdistricts (landschappen).
The four candidates for district head of East Sumba are all closely associated with 
their domain of origin: Lukas Mbili Kaborang originates from Karera, Umbu Mehang 
Kunda from Rindi, Pindingara from Tabundung, and Alphonsius from Lewa (but he 
grew up in Mangili). Only Umbu Mehang is undoubtedly of noble descent. Other 
factors defining the candidates' identities include the position and occupation of their 
fathers, and place of origin, occupation, and status of their wife's family. Part of each 
candidate's credit is based on his parents' fame.
Sumbanese leaders traditionally find their political followers by relying on kinship 
and marriage alliances. The phrase "politics of kinship" on Sumba refers to how 
hierarchies, rules, and morality of kinship are used for political ends. Politics of kinship 
is a style and strategy that is not confined to relations with real kinsmen, but which 
also can be used to create a new "we"-group, in which rules of generalized reciprocity 
apply.22
M ap 1
East Sumba Traditional D om ains Consolidated  
into L an d sch ap p en  in 1920
22 Marshal Sahlins, Stone Age Economies (Chicago: Aldine, 19/2), p. 193.
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A funeral on Sumba provides a good illustration of the ways in which kinship 
politics are used to create constituency. Traditionally, funerals are the most important 
ceremonies in this society, since they involve establishing relations with the divine 
ancestors. A good funeral, with a proper tomb and sufficient amount of livestock 
slaughtered for the deceased to "take along to the land of the spirits," has 
repercussions on the living: it will improve their welfare. A funeral is the only 
ceremony for which people are not invited, but instead are just expected, to attend. A 
large crowd of guests contributes to the quality of the funeral. Funeral ceremonies last 
for days or longer, and during these ceremonies there is plenty of time to linger and 
chat with other guests. Especially the night wakes before the funeral are perfect 
occasions for youth to gather and socialize.
The incumbent bupati of East Sumba, Umbu Mehang Kunda, was very active in 
attending funerals in East Sumba during 2004. When he made an appearance, a line of 
Jeeps would drive up to the site of the ceremony, resembling a traditional party of 
guests (rombongan adat). The bupati always brought a contribution for the bereaved 
family, either money or livestock. Rumor said he had a special budget item designated 
for these occasions, called "the tactical fund" (dana taktis). Traditionally, such a gift is 
expected to be reciprocated in the form of a pig, but in an election year, the payback 
involves, instead, political support for Golkar. Members of the politician's retinue 
conduct themselves like kinsmen—as if the politician were a relative of the deceased 
person—and the strength of this type of politics lies in the reciprocal economy. 
Sumba's large barter economy is ruled by the morality of exchange,23 which, in this 
example of the funeral, is used to create ties between people in order to put them in a 
relationship of mutual obligation. But this process only works when corresponding 
norms are widely socially accepted. The morality of exchange, which values 
generalized reciprocity within the "we"-group as part of Sumbanese tradition,24 is an 
ideational political resource.
Wealth on Sumba used to be measured and expressed in terms of livestock—water 
buffaloes, horses, and cattle—and, especially in the humid rural areas of the island, in 
the capacity to produce food (which required a combination of paddy fields and labor). 
Wealthy men organize large feasts to prove their capacity to produce food, create 
surpluses, and display their power to get other people to contribute. The size and 
shape of their families' tombs are also very important indicators of wealth and status. 
Material resources are required to construct such tombs, and once they have been built, 
they stand as potent symbols of strength and status. Modern types of indicators of 
material wealth—symbols of power—are the size, shape, and number of houses owned 
by a family. According to present-day norms, a successful Sumbanese should have 
several houses: one in his home village, one in the Sumbanese town where he resides 
when he is on Sumba, and one in Kupang or on Java. His houses on Sumba are 
preferably built along the main road, and combine typical traditional Sumbanese 
stylistic elements—like peak roofs—with "wealthy" building materials: plastered stone 
walls, tiles for decoration, tiles on the floor. A person's style of dress can also act as a 
symbol of power. The uniform is the symbol of State power. Those who wear a
23 J. A. C. Vel, "The Uma-Economy: Indigenous Economics and Development Work in Lawonda, Sumba 
(Eastern Indonesia)" (PhD dissertation, Agricultural University, Wageningen, 1994), especially chap. 3, 
"The Morality of Exchange."
24 Ibid., pp. 62-66.
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uniform are associated with the network of people who have access to funds and jobs 
and all kinds of privileges that are out of reach for ordinary people. The election 
candidates who want to stress their affinity with Sumbanese tradition wear (semi-) 
traditional clothing.
Charisma and Rhetoric
Benedict Anderson's classic article, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," points 
out the cultural differences that complicate a Westerner's attempt to understand what 
Javanese power is, who is powerful, and why. He argues that, 'The contemporary 
Western concept of power is an abstraction deduced from observed patterns of social 
interaction; it is believed to be derived from heterogeneous sources; it is no way 
inherently self-limiting; and it is morally ambiguous." By contrast, "the Javanese see 
power as something concrete, homogeneous, constant in total quantity, and without 
inherent moral implications as such."25 Anderson suggests how a discussion on these 
concepts from the Javanese side might start with: "Westerners have a concept of 
kesakten quite different from ours: they divide it up into concepts like power, 
legitimacy, and charisma."26 Applying these distinctions to an analysis of power on 
Sumba, we find that a traditional concept comparable to "power" is ndewa. D. K. 
Wielenga touched upon this matter for Sumba in a short essay written in 1925 in which 
he describes the similarities between the philosophy of the famous physicist, Thomas 
Edison, and "the Sumbanese" with regards to power, life, and energy.27 Very shortly 
summarized, this view accepts that all life on earth is identical and all beings live 
because they are occupied by power—life, energy—which in Sumbanese language 
(Kambera) is called ndewa. This power originates from outside the human atmosphere, 
according to Edison, as a glowing ball of energy, from which tiny parts are scattered 
and create life wherever on earth they land. According to the Sumbanese, the souls of 
their deceased forefathers will eventually reach the ultimate God, who crushes their 
souls and sprinkles them out over the earth, returning ndewa to the earth and bringing 
life force and vitality to whatever object it touches, including trees and stones. Vitality 
and fertility are signs that a human has received ndewa. If a person dies and his 
relatives organize a very fine funeral, slaughtering a fair number of livestock and 
providing him with a proper tomb, then the living can expect to get more ndewa.
Wielenga's reflection might sound inapplicable to the subject of political power and 
leadership in contemporary Sumba. It is very relevant, though. Umbu Dingu, the 
current secretary general of the Protestant Christian Church of Sumba, member of 
Anakalang's aristocracy, told me that he had been invited by several political parties to 
be a candidate for their party in the 2004 elections. As the highest official of the most 
important church on Sumba, he was likely to appeal to many voters, who would see 
him as the leader of their church. When I asked him whether he has any other special 
qualities that would qualify him as the perfect candidate, he told me about how he can
25 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press [1972], 1990), pp. 22-23.
26 Ibid, p. 20, note 8.
27 D. K. Wielenga, "Beschouwingen over het leven door Edison en door den Soembanees," De Macedonier 
29 (1925): 33-38. Wielenga bases his description of Edison's ideas on "an article in the American journal 
Nash of May 1924."
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make tombstones move, a clear sign of possessing (a large share of) ndewa. Ndewa is a 
personal attribute, which can be recognized by its effects and symbols. It is the core of 
charisma, and it is the only resource that cannot be actively acquired by potential 
leaders. A Sumbanese leader needs this type of charisma if he wishes to rise to the level 
of primus inter pares. Charisma will convince the audience his leadership is legitimated 
by ancestral powers; it appears in positive results in negotiations and is strengthened 
by the use of traditional symbols.
Charisma is a personal attribute that legitimizes leadership. On Sumba, charismatic 
leaders are typically excellent orators. The style of rhetoric that works best is culturally 
determined and changes constantly. In 2004-2005, political rhetoric in local election 
campaigns on Sumba, and in the lobbying campaign that advocated the creation of 
new districts, consisted of a combination of Christian sanctimonious talk, New Order 
jargon, quasi-ritual speech, colloquial talk, and fashionable television language, 
appealing to different groups or different identities in the audience. Joel Kuipers's 
opening statement in his book, Power in Performance, which explains that on the island 
of Sumba a vibrant form of ritual speech is required in all ceremonial events,28 could 
have been part of a manual for election campaigns.
Lukas Kaborang, the accustomed rival of the bupati, is no master of ritual speech, 
but he has adopted its style. The style of "a real man," a traditional type of leader, is 
fierce, competitive, and masculine. This is the style of the "angry man" (kabani mbani), a 
term in which the word mbani refers to "anger, daring, threatening, rage."29 The anger 
involved is not emotional, but is instead institutionalized public anger, meant to show 
that the person involved is central and masculine, capable of defining and 
exemplifying the social order.
Contemporary Leadership Criteria and Voters' Assessments
Sumba is part of a larger world, not just an island by itself. As a region of 
Indonesia, it is connected to the rest of the world through mass media and 
communication facilities, and through direct engagement, as Sumbanese travel back 
and forth to other areas. The large majority of the people on Sumba are Christians, 
either Protestant or Catholic. The number of people with university degrees is 
growing, and rose to 2 percent of the population in East Sumba in 2002.30 Thousands of 
these relatively well-educated Sumbanese live elsewhere in Indonesia or even abroad, 
and nearly all of them stay in touch with their home island, where their relatives care 
for their ancestral villages and lands. They are the sources of information concerning a 
high standard of living that is within reach on Java or Bali, creating the ideal for many 
Sumbanese residing on Sumba. The path leading to this ideal is through education and 
bureaucratic careers. Successful Sumbanese are recognized by data on their resume 
that prove they have advanced along this path.
28 Joel C. Kuipers, Power in Performance: The Creation o f  Textual Authority in Weyewa Ritual Speech 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), p. ix.
29 Joel C. Kuipers, Language, Identity, and Marginality in Indonesia: The Changing Nature o f Ritual Speech on the 
Island o f Sumba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 48-49.
30 "Sumba Timur in Figures 2002," p. 140.
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When I asked voters in the months before the assembly elections in 2004 to explain 
their assessment of the candidates to me, apart from categorizing them according to 
place of origin and identity in terms of kinship relationships, they would stress past 
and present professional positions (preferably in the state bureaucracy), social status, 
fame in general, and, in particular, the candidate's reputation concerning his motives 
to become assembly member, supported by reports of his prior accomplishments and 
honesty, or, alternately, his alleged record of corruption.
Place of origin and kinship relations indicate the accessibility of a candidate, and 
past experience was said to reveal whether the candidate would be likely to invest 
more public funds in the assembly members' or the district head's home area. Past and 
present positions reflect a person's professional success and access to the higher levels 
of bureaucracy and funds, and thus help measure the potential abilities of the 
candidate as a broker between the electorate and higher levels of power and money.
For district head candidates, the voters' assessments were actually no different. The 
pairs of candidates adopted or confirmed their profiles in opposition to the others: 
Lukman was the pair that cared for the poor and agriculture, MeGi the pair that would 
maintain the current policy of economic development centered around town and 
industry, Sius would give a high priority to health and agriculture, whereas PinRef 
would be the best partnership for attracting outside investment and caring for the 
interests of the Muslims in Savunese31 communities.
The former district head of West Sumba, Umbu Djima, outlined the criteria for the 
position based on his own experiences. He presented a normative, Sumbanese-elitist
perspective:
The best District Head is he who (1) is guided by the Lord, (2) is wise and able to 
design intelligent strategies, (3) deploys a humble attitude that makes him 
accessible, (4) is honest and not sensitive to corruption, (5) is a good manager 
who knows how to delegate, and who will not let others (e.g. his wife) 
manipulate him, and (6) has plenty of self-confidence.32
The antonyms of all these criteria are often heard when people disqualify certain 
candidates: that one does not go to church anymore and gambles with youngsters, the 
other is too arrogant and unable to cooperate with anyone, the third is angry and 
emotional all the time, and so forth.
State Legitimacy and Violence
The district's head's power is also a matter of the material resources he controls. In 
East Sumba, the government is the largest source of funds, business contracts, and 
salaries. The government's budget increased from 150 billion rupiah during Lukas 
Kaborang's term as district head (1995-1999) to 900 billion in the last period (1999- 
2005), when Umbu Mehang was in charge. In 2002,33 the total government budget was 
146 billion, of which 93 percent consisted of funds originating from outside the area,
31 From the island Savu, located between Sumba and Timor.
32 Interview with Umbu Djima on June 22, 2005; also, Tambur 17, June 7-20, 2005.
33 Figures in this section are derived from "Sumba Timur in Figures 2002," Badan Pusat Statistik 
Kabupaten Sumba Timur, Popinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur (2003).
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with the share received from Jakarta—the General Allocation Fund—figuring as the 
most important budget income item, at 128 billion rupiah. East Sumba's government 
used 65 percent for its own routine expenditures, most of which is dedicated to 
salaries. The Regional Gross Domestic Product of East Sumba in the same year was 458 
billion rupiah.
Government jobs are extremely important on Sumba, since it is very hard to find 
other salaried employment on the island. According to the official statistics of East 
Sumba, in 2002 only 9 percent of the working population had a regular position with a 
salary. Those who hold these positions use their monetary income mainly to support 
their extended families, especially with education, housing, health care, and weddings.
In 1998, competition over access to government jobs incited mass violence in 
Waikabubak, the capital of West Sumba.34 The bupati at that time, Rudolf Malo, was 
accused of corrupt practices at the annual exam for new civil servants; it was alleged 
that he had favored his own kinsmen over other, more qualified, candidates. The 
demonstrations protesting these alleged actions were subsequently inflated into a 
conflict between two sub-ethnic groups in West Sumba, both of which were supported 
by the two main political rivals at that time, the bupati and the chairman of the local 
assembly. Sub-ethnic rivalry is age-old in Sumba and can be easily ignited, as was the 
case in 2002-2003 during the campaign for creating a new district in West Sumba.35 
During the New Order period, potential conflicts of this sort were suppressed under 
the policy that restricted any reference to SARA—ethnicity, religion, race, or class—in 
order to guard the unity of the nation. During the pilkada, the General Election 
Committee set a strict campaigning schedule, separating the candidates' meetings 
geographically to avoid clashes between supporters. Also, it was in the candidates' 
best interests to avoid inflaming sub-ethnic divisions, and instead to create a unifying 
and inclusive political identity. For this reason, every candidate chose a deputy from a 
sub-ethnic group other than his own.
State legitimacy of leaders is supported by the local bureaucrats: all people 
employed by the government and, in particular, official civil servants (pegawai negeri 
sipil, PNS). Bureaucrats make up a major share of Sumba's educated elite, since 
winning a government position is the goal of education on Sumba. Together the 
bureaucrats form a strong network of vested interests, still closely linked to Golkar. 
Election law explicitly prohibited civil servants from participating in any election 
activities.36 Therefore public discussions concerning the district head elections had to 
be conducted without public contributions from this educated elite group. They could 
voice their opinions through others who were allowed to express their support openly, 
for instance (unemployed) youths, retired civil servants, private entrepreneurs, 
farmers, NGO workers, and so forth. The bureaucrats also refrained from participating 
in the election gatherings, except when a candidate happened to be a very close 
relative.
34 Jacqueline Vel, "Tribal Battle in a Remote Island: Crisis and Violence in Sumba (Eastern Indonesia)," 
Indonesia 11 (October 2001): 141-158.
35 Jacqueline Vel, "Creating a New District in West Sumba," in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in 
Post-Soeharto Indonesia, ed. H. Schulte Nordholt and G. van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, forthcoming 
2006).
36 Law 32 of 2004 about Regional Government, section 79 and 80.
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Bureaucrats were not only motivated to maintain a low profile by the law 
prohibiting their involvement in district head election politics; their private 
assessments of risk would have also inclined them to keep quiet. Those who openly 
support a candidate who then fails to win the election might well put their professional 
positions at risk. The district head cannot easily dismiss civil servants, but he can 
certainly block any upward mobility in their bureaucratic career.
East Sumba's Two Big Men
Two men in East Sumba have been competing for the position of district head over 
the last ten years. Lukas Mbili Kaborang won the first round in 1994, when he was a 
bureaucrat in the provincial capital, Kupang. Of the five candidates proposed by the 
assembly in East Sumba, Pak Lukas37 was named first on the list that the governor sent 
to Jakarta for approval. He was elected with eleven votes, compared to nine for his 
major competitor, Umbu Mehang Kunda, and none for the third candidate, and he 
served as district head from 1995 to 1999. After the 1999 elections, Umbu Mehang— 
until that moment representative of the region in the national assembly in Jakarta— 
won the election among assembly members by a one-vote margin and was appointed 
as district head from 1999 to 2005. The struggle between the two old rivals, East 
Sumba's big men, forms the core of current local politics in East Sumba.
Lukas Mbili Kaborang is the older of the two rivals.38 He was born around 1938 in 
the domain of Karera. He does not belong to the nobility of this area, yet refers to his 
area of origin as if it were his personal territory. His father died when he was still 
young, leaving the family in poverty. In his campaign speeches, he related this first 
part of his life to stress his knowledge of and commitment to the poor on Sumba 
(according to the regional Human Development Index, more than half of East Sumba's 
population lives in poverty). Lukas left the island to go to school on the island of 
Sumbawa when he was still young. He returned to Sumba when the first public 
secondary school (SMP Negeri) was opened in Waingapu, and graduated in 1960. In 
those days, educated Sumbanese were rare. Lukas wanted to get a job at the civil 
service, went to Kupang to try his luck, and had already found a job at the governor's 
office by December 1960. He married a Timorese woman. While continuing his 
education and his work, he became active in politics. He became a regional board 
member of Parkindo (The Christian Party of Indonesia), regional secretary of the 
Christian youth movement, secretary of the Christian Farmers' Union, and in 1966 also 
the general chairman of the Kupang branch of the Christian Students' Movement of 
Indonesia. In 1971, he ceased his political activities when Suharto merged all political 
parties into three main streams, with the Christian parties being joined under the 
nationalist umbrella. His bureaucratic career flourished and enabled Pak Lukas to 
study in Surabaya; finally he graduated in 1983, at age forty-five, from the Undana 
University in Kupang. Since he was a bureaucrat, he was automatically made a 
member of Golkar, and he became an active member in Kupang. He campaigned to 
become district head in East Sumba in 1993, asserting that his excellent connections to
37 Lukas Kaborang is usually referred to as Pak (Mister) Lukas , and will not be called "Umbu" since he 
does not belong to the nobility.
381 thank Johan Bokdam, who interviewed Lukas Kaborang about his life history on July 7, 2004, and was 
willing to share this information with me.
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the provincial bureaucracy and governor could be instrumental in attracting more 
attention and funds for Sumba. Lukas Kaborang had been away from Sumba for thirty 
years, and was unknown to most of its population, yet he was elected, and during his 
term as district head, he earned fame as an active and honest ruler who visited all the 
villages and was interested in agriculture.
Umbu Mehang Kunda is not a populist type of leader. His strength lies in his 
ability to make compelling arguments and, most of all, in creating a strong supportive 
network. Umbu Mehang belongs to the nobility from Rindi and is closely related to the 
raja of Rindi. He is a generation younger than his main opponent, as he was born after 
World War II. He studied in Salatiga on Java and married a wife of Chinese-Javanese 
origin. He was member of the National Assembly in Jakarta, aligned with Golkar, from 
1987 until 1999. As a result, his political links with Jakarta are substantial. He is also 
famous because of his extensive business network, which he has used to attract 
industries to Sumba—the new drinking water plant is the latest example. An 
incumbent district head and a good businessman, he is regarded as the wealthiest 
candidate. He is the boss of the current Sumbanese bureaucracy, the patron who holds 
power over the jobs and security of the region's civil service workers.
Umbu Mehang has long been associated with corruption, not only on Sumba but 
also in prior periods, when he was a member of the national assembly in Jakarta 
representing Sumba.39 These allegations have never been proven, however. Rumor 
about his "money politics" in the last elections for district head are well known in 
Waingapu. Although Lukas Kaborang was well respected and popular as incumbent 
district head in 1999, Umbu Mehang still won that election by one vote, allegedly 
because he bribed assembly members.
In the months before he was allowed to begin his official 2005 campaign, Umbu 
Mehang openly denounced any form of money politics, accusing other candidates of 
this practice.40 During several village gatherings, which were called "family meetings" 
and which took place on May 5 and 6 in Lewa subdistrict, Umbu Mehang scorned the 
lack of self-respect implicit in the practice of vote buying and added that he would 
only be proud if chosen "because the voters appreciate what I did during the last five 
years as district head,"41 but did not mention any concrete accomplishments.
Political Parties and the 2005 Elections
Even these two big men cannot manage without political parties. Both Lukas 
Kaborang and Umbu Mehang were Golkar members until 1999. After his defeat in the 
1999 district head elections, Lukas Kaborang left Golkar and retired. With the national 
elections in 2004 coming up, he was invited by several parties to stand as their 
candidate, since he was still popular in East Sumba and could attract many votes. He 
eventually chose the PPDK (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, The National
39 He is number 84 on the list of parliament members who were suspected of Corruption, Collusion or 
Nepotism; the list was composed by Gerakan Serjana Jakarta in 1998. See
http:/ / www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1998/06/02/0067.htm l, accessed on August 12, 2005.
40 http:/ / www.sumbatimur.go.id/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid=122, accessed on 
June 5, 2005.
41 idem: pertemuan keluarga di dusun Pada Njara Hamu desa Kangeli dan desa Umamanu (5/ 5) dan di 
dusun Mbidipraing desa Watumbelar kecamatan Lewa.
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Democratic Unity Party), a new party set up by political analyst Andi Mallarangeng 
and the former Minister of Regional Autonomy and Administrative Reform, Ryaas 
Rasyid. Prof. Rasyid was also Lukas Kaborang's former teacher, and the PPDK reached 
out to the regions through the network of Rasyid's former pupils. PPDK was one of the 
few political parties that tried to honor regional autonomy and practice bottom-up 
democracy.42 One consequence of this policy was the liberty offered to Lukas 
Kaborang, who was not only offered the number one spot on the PPDK's list for the 
regional assembly elections in East Sumba in April 2004, but was also appointed local 
chairman of the party and allowed to invite his choice of candidates to complete the 
list. The regional assembly elections were an overwhelming success for Lukas 
Kaborang and his PPDK: they won six seats out of twenty-five in the assembly and 
were the second largest party after Golkar (eleven seats). PPDK's victory was not a 
national phenomenon, since this party did not reach the necessary electoral threshold 
to compete for seats in the national parliament. Apparently, the victory in East Sumba 
was more of a personal success for Lukas Kaborang than a victory for the political 
party that put him first on its list.
Umbu Mehang's candidacy for Golkar was essentially preordained, although a 
formal selection process within the party was required to perfume his accession with 
the scent of democracy. On the official Government of East Sumba's website, there is a 
short report of a meeting of Golkar's youth organization (AMPG, Angkatan Muda 
Partai Golkar) on October 2, 2004, in which they discussed regional head candidacies. 
All members favored Umbu Mehang as their candidate, but for the position of deputy, 
eleven names were mentioned. It is interesting that five of these eleven candidates 
eventually became candidates for other parties. Apparently personal characteristics 
were more important than party affiliation. This is even more obvious in an article in 
the local newspaper, Tambur, published in the November 16-23, 2004 issue, which lists 
figur-figur baton43—people with known aspirations to become regional head or 
deputy—according to the geographical areas from which they originate, without 
mentioning their political party affiliation.44 In March, Golkar's regional board sent the 
names of five pairs of candidates to the provincial board "for verification," and had 
three of them returned with approval. On April 5, 2005, Golkar's subregional party 
chairmen's council selected the partners Umbu Menhang and Gidion Mbilijora with a 
81 percent majority vote.
Two other political parties were entitled to propose a pair of candidates for the 
elections: PDI-P and PKPI (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian 
Justice and Unity Party), both of which controlled four seats in the regional assembly. 
PDI-P had initially wanted to have Lukas Kaborang as its candidate, but he preferred 
the PPDK candidacy. PDI-P only came up with one other candidate for regional head, 
Dr. Alphonsius Anapaku, a medical specialist (gynecologist) in Kupang. His father was 
a well-respected health worker in Lewa, not a nobleman, and his mother a Savunese. 
He grew up with relatives in Melolo. For the position of deputy on the PDI-P slate, two 
names were proposed. First was Ir. Ignasius Kalukur Lidjang, a researcher at the 
Institute for Research on Agricultural Technology Naibonat in Kupang, who had
42 Tony Sitathanm, "Indonesia: Politicizing the Gatekeepers," Asia Times online, January 8, 2004. See 
http: / / www.ahmes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FA08Ae)%.html, accessed on May 15, 2005.
43 Balon is an abbreviation of bahkal calon, meaning an aspiring candidate.
44 Tambur 7, November 16-23, 2004, p. 3.
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graduated in soil science from Gadja Madha University in Yogyakarta. Second was 
Semi Lobo, a member of the central board of the party in Jakarta. The chairman of the 
provincial PDI-P board praised the three candidates because of their loyalty to the 
party. Subsequently Semi Lobo withdrew from the campaign, however, so it never 
became clear whether the PDI-P slate for East Sumba was decided on the provincial 
level or in Jakarta. The PDI-P pair was not very well known in East Sumba, and so it 
invested substantial funds in posters and other promotional materials that were visible 
all over East Sumba. On paper, this pair looked like a team that would be quite 
competent in developing government healthcare and agricultural services, and would 
attract voters who were inclined to shift their allegiance away from the vested elite. 
Alphonsius and Ignasius had been classmates at secondary school, and during the 
campaign they were called by the shared pieces of their names: Sius. It is possible that 
PDI-P chose to field this new candidate not only to contest this particular election, but 
also as part of a strategy to prepare for the 2009 elections. In 1999, PDI-P had gained a 
strong position as East Sumba's second party, but it lost in the 2004 parliamentary 
election and kept only four seats. A new candidate could help to restore the party's 
image.
The fourth party to propose a pair of candidates was the PKPI. It had won four 
seats in the April 2004 elections for the district assembly in East Sumba. That small 
victory had largely been due to the popularity of several local leaders. Ir. Umbu 
Manggana, working for the mining service of East Sumba, was the PKPI's top 
candidate for regional head, with Drs. Kristoffel A. Paraing as his deputy. Umbu 
Manggana is middle aged, of noble descent, and used to be head of public works in 
East Sumba until Umbu Mehang shifted him to another, clearly inferior, position after 
he had openly criticized the district head. When the proposals of the fifteen subdistrict 
PKPI boards were sent to the provincial and central board of the party, the Board of 
National Leaders of the PKPI decided to reject the candidates proposed by "the 
grassroots" and choose another pair, Drs. Langu Pindingara and Drs. Refafi Gah. Party 
members on East Sumba were furious and destroyed the party's office in Waingapu. 
This had no effect on the candidacy, however, and subsequently several subdistrict 
party board members openly declared their support for Lukas Kaborang and Emanual 
Babu Eha in the coming elections.
The national party board's choice of Pindingara and Refafi Gah is hard to 
understand in any way except as a matter involving "money politics." Rumor in 
Waingapu had it that East Sumba's PKPI Chairman had received a fifty million rupiah 
bribe to accept and support Pindingara's candidacy.
Drs. Langu Pindingara was born on Sumba in 1958 in desa Prai Karang, and his 
roots extend back to the region of Tabundung. He does not belong to the nobility. 
Compensating for his lower social status, he testified proudly in a newspaper 
interview of being the owner of a race horse, which is a potent symbol of Sumbanese 
masculine power.45 His current position is Head Regional Treasurer in Gresik on East 
Java. He had a fine bureaucratic career, specializing in finance, and previous 
experience as head of the section that granted licenses and monitored building 
activities for public works in Gresik will have given him ample experience in dealing
45 Tambur 8, December 2-15, 2004, p. 9.
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with (the benefits of) corruption. The local newspapers in East Sumba were skeptical 
about him. He is neither familiar with nor known on Sumba, and his supporting team 
(tim sukses) is reportedly based in Surabaya, a situation that has exacerbated local 
concern about the team's motives. Tambur reported in November 2004 that Pindingara 
was not yet certain which party he would use as a vehicle to help him secure East 
Sumba's top position. The Tambur article describes how Pindingara first tried the 
PPDK, but its chairman, Lukas Kaborang, refused to support him; after that, he 
considered PDI-P or PKPI.
His candidate for deputy, Refafi Gah, had been member of the provincial assembly 
in Kupang for the last five years for PPD (Partai Persatuan Daerah, The Regional 
United Party), but was not re-elected in 2004. He is a university teacher in Kupang. In 
terms of winning a constituency, Refafi Gah is an asset because of his ethnicity. He is 
Savunese, a member of the second largest ethnic group living on Sumba after the 
Sumbanese; the Savunese constitute about 12 percent of the voting population.46 
Pindingara was the first candidate in this election who openly used the issue of 
ethnicity to win votes. He also tried to present himself as the candidate who would 
bring economic prosperity to the region, and tried to appeal to Muslim voters.
Rhetoric and "The Angry Man"
When Lukas Kaborang addressed the audience in his June 2005 campaign 
speeches, he displayed himself in his capacity as an "angry man." His speech was— 
like all effective ritual speech on Sumba—loud, a pulsating flow of words. It contained 
many threats: towards those who accused him of communist sympathies, towards the 
General Election Committee, and towards his rivals. 'The angry man" style also 
appeared in the protests Lukas Kaborang voiced against other members of the 
assembly, against the current district head, against the election committee, and against 
anyone else who had acted in a way he disapproved of. He presented himself as the 
nemesis of the incumbent district head, Umbu Mehang.
Many voters in East Sumba appreciated this style, saying Lukas is "strict and angry 
for our own good." Yet during the official election campaign period in June 2005, his 
fierceness came close to aggression, and his masculine anger provoked violence among 
young adherents. His angry style turned against him in this period, when more and 
more people commented that because he was, first and foremost, frustrated by the loss 
of his position to Umbu Mehang in the 1999 elections, he was now campaigning in 
negative terms, whereas the other candidates were stressing positive opportunities.
Alphonsius Anapaku used a completely different rhetorical style: he is a master of 
Indonesian karaoke. A good election campaign on Sumba should include singing 
performances, and the best campaigners are those who can sing a song themselves. 
This feature has been popular in the Philippines for a long time and was introduced in 
Indonesia during the presidential elections in 2004, where presidential candidates 
Wiranto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono turned out to be accomplished singers. On 
Sumba, Christian pop songs provide the best frameworks for campaign songs.
46 According to statistics of the Central Statistics Office (BPS) in 2000.
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Other Supportive Networks and Sources of Legitimacy
All candidates tried to find organized support in the months previous to the 
elections. Organized support is arranged through institutions that have their own 
types of social organization and hierarchies, and their own norms and rules of conduct. 
In elections, political parties are self-evidently such institutions. In Sumba, the private 
business sector, the church, the state bureaucracy, and traditional kinship and 
customary law structures can also be used to acquire support.
All pairs of candidates in the district head elections were surrounded by a tim 
sukses, the promotion team, which consisted of advisors, investors, well-known 
supporters, and party officials. Golkar organized a promotion team in every election 
area, and its members held meetings with local leaders to inform them about the 
advantages of choosing their candidate.47 The other political parties did not have such 
a well-organized and widespread network. The identities of the investors involved in 
the promotion teams were not always clear. Some local businessmen—nearly all ethnic 
Chinese—openly declared their support for one of the candidates, while others diluted 
their risk by contributing to the campaigns of several candidates. In East Sumba, the 
district head is very influential in all business contracts and contracting projects. 
Tambur newspaper reported that the promotion team of the PinRef candidate pair was 
based in Surabaya, suggesting that it consisted of investors only.48 Local businessmen 
are extremely important in an election campaign: they control the whole transport 
sector in Sumba, and the candidates need their trucks and busses to transport their 
supporters. Their support is also vital when it comes time to handle the logistics 
involved in campaign feasting, especially for those candidates who could not muster 
sufficient support and contributions from the local population to help supply all the 
ingredients necessary to create a commensal feast.
Apart from relying on their promotion teams, including Chinese businessmen, all 
pairs of candidates used every other social network they could think of for raising 
support.49 On March 18, 2005, well before the official campaign period opened, the 
Association of West Sumbanese (who reside in East Sumba) held an open-air meeting 
in Waingapu, where two thousand people attended and Umbu Mehang was invited to 
speak.50 The coordinator of this meeting, Umbu Kaludang, recalled that 23,000 West 
Sumbanese live and work in Waingapu and its environs, and all of these are eligible to 
vote in Waingapu. Although Umbu Kaludang is head of the Agricultural Service in 
East Sumba, and therefore should not have openly mixed in politics, according to 
election laws, as coordinator of this West Sumbanese gathering he openly declared that 
he and his association supported Umbu Mehang and Gidion Mbilijora. A significant 
aspect of this declaration was that the politician invoked the concept of a "West 
Sumbanese" political identity in the context of East Sumbanese elections, and that 
"West Sumbanese" was regarded as a unifying label in East Sumba only.
47 Interview with Paulus Saga Anakaka, Golkar Promotion Team member, in Anakalang, June 20, 2005. 
Paulus S. Anakaka graduated in Malang, was chairman of the Christian Students' Organization in Malang 
(GMKI), is an active member of Golkar in West Sumba, and is currently unemployed (i.e. he has no 
position the bureaucracy), yet working in agriculture and as chairman of a farmers' group.
48 Tambur 7, November 16-31, 2004, p. 10.
49 "Paguyuban warga Sumbar dukung Mehang-Gigion," Pos Kupang, March 20, 2005. See
http: / / www.indomedia.com/ poskup/2005/03/21 / edisi21/2103hum2.htm, accessed on May 25, 2005.
50 Ibid.
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The Christian church is an important institution on Sumba with a large 
constituency, and therefore another potentially interesting network for creating 
political identity and support. The official policies of both the Protestant Christian 
Church of Sumba and the Catholic Church require their representatives to refrain from 
any involvement in politics. Some individual reverends openly support candidates, 
however. All candidates in the East Sumba district head elections tried to present 
themselves as active members of a church, for example by starting every meeting, 
gathering, or feast with a Christian prayer. The father of Refafi Gah of the team PinRef 
had been one of the most important reverends of the early Protestant church, and this 
fact was cited to bolster his reputation. Small-scale "money politics" involving the 
church do come into play; candidates who wish to be positively associated with a 
church will make contributions. So, for example, a candidate in West Sumba financed 
the purchase of all the chairs in the new church in his home area, while Umbu Mehang 
regularly gave subsidies to the Protestant Christian Church to help finance their central 
meetings. Lukas Kaborang stressed his connection to the church in the campaigns 
leading up to the parliamentary elections in 2004 by announcing publicly that the 
acronym for his party, PDK, stood for Partai Dengan Kristus, the Party with Christ. In 
general, people on Sumba prefer a leader to be of their own religion, but this is just one 
of the criteria, and not a very distinguishing one, since all candidates in East Sumba are 
Protestant Christians, except Ignasius Kalukur Lidjang, who is a Catholic.
A candidate's alliances with the traditional Sumbanese nobility may be just as 
significant as his association with a Christian church. A headline in Pos Kupang's 
December 20, 2004 issue declared "Four Rajas in East Sumba Support Mehang." The 
domains of kings involved covered the areas of Lewa Kambera, Kanatang-Kapunduk, 
Rindi and Melolo-Mangili, the areas darkened on the map below.51
Map 2
51 "Empat Raja di Sumtim dukung Mehang," Pos Kupang, December 20, 2004. See 
http: / / www.indomedia.com/poskup/2004/12/21 /edisi21/2112huml.htm
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In January, Pos Kupang reported that the PinRef candidates received support from 
the descendants of royal families in Lewa, Kanganggar (Karera), and Tabundung, 
which means at least one area overlapped one already claimed by the supporters of 
Umbu Mehang. This suggests that for the "traditional kings," it pays to present oneself 
as a royal descendant, and that for the candidates, securing public support from a king 
might be a way to buy a traditional constituency's votes. In this case, a report in the 
regional newspaper was also directed at a broader Sumbanese audience and could 
have served to prove Pindingara's connections with Sumbanese culture and traditions, 
connections that had often been disputed, because Pindingara had lived on Java for 
most of his life.
The general pattern of gaining support through various existing networks was that 
a candidate sought out meetings that would or could have been held for another 
reason and sought to appropriate part of each meeting in order to discuss his political 
agenda. The trade-off at such an occasion is that the candidate should provide the 
meeting with money, food, and livestock (to be slaughtered for the meal). Buying votes 
directly, or buying sympathy, distributing "gifts," creating reciprocal obligations, or 
promising rewards in the future all belong to the spectrum that measures and defines 
"money politics." Whether these are illegal activities is a question with no 
unambiguous answer.
Grassroots Involvement
Lukas Kaborang's campaign was focused on organizing displays of grassroots 
involvement and approval. The media associated Lukas Kaborang with the term arus 
bawah, literally meaning "undercurrent," but more accurately translated in this context 
as "aspirations from below." According to one scholar, "although the term arus bawah 
first appeared in connection to Megawati's rise to the PDI chair, it quickly came to be 
used in relation to a range of other issues in which public opinion was seen to have 
influenced government politics or voiced protests of different kinds."52 Lukas 
Kaborang has become a symbol for opposition against the vested interests of the 
Golkar elite—in spite of the fact that only six years before the 2005 elections, he was 
Golkar's district head himself. At every occasion, he criticized his competitor, the 
incumbent district head, of being exclusively interested in urban development, 
especially building projects, and forgetting the interests of the majority of East Sumba's 
population, who rely on agriculture for their livelihood. Since Lukas Kaborang is a 
retired civil servant, with no power over the bureaucracy, nor does he have the wealth 
to buy votes, his strategy had to be to win the "grassroots votes."
Competitive Feasting
Since official campaigning was restricted to a short period before the elections, 
candidates had to think of another type of event that could be used to win popular 
support, one to which the Election Committee could not object. Leaders everywhere in
52 Stefan Eklof, Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and 
Decline o f the New Order (1986-1998) (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004), p. 226.
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the world try to muster large crowds as a visible sign of support to reinforce their 
political power. In the context of Sumbanese political culture, Joel Kuipers calls this 
feature "the ideology of audience completeness."53 The higher the degree of audience 
completeness, the higher the authority of the leader. A key aspect of a leader's social 
influence, prestige, and status is the capacity to create a "complete audience." 
Audience completeness increases with the number of people who attend, with their 
degree of satisfaction with the service provided at the event—ideally, in Sumba, guests 
are addressed politely and served a hearty meal with meat—and in the volume and 
number of verbal responses they produce during the leader's oration.
Feasting is commonly put to use in Sumba to express, create, and consolidate social 
relations. It is also a means to increase prestige and status. In economies where labor is 
the main resource, leaders compete for control over social resources, rather than 
material ones. Leaders are powerful because they can enforce their authority over 
others. Feasting, defined by Michael Dietler54 as a form of public ritual activity centered 
around the communal consumption of food and drink, provides an opportunity for a 
Sumbanese "big man" to create legitimacy as a leader.
Feasting can ... create cooperative alliances between social groups, ... attract 
desirable allies by advertising the success of the group, create political power 
through the creation of a network of reciprocal debts, ... and extract surplus 
produce from the general populace for elite use.55
On April 29, 2005, Lukas Kaborang and his election partner Emanuel Babu Eha, 
organized a large feast in East Sumba's capital, Waingapu. They distributed sixteen 
thousand printed invitations,56 through which they announced the following events:
1) a Christian ceremony to give thanks for the successful conclusion of five years' 
of service as Deputy District Head for Emanual Babu Eha;
2) the house-warming party in Emanuel Babu Eha's new private home;
3) the launching feast of Lukas Kaborang and Emanuel Eha's candidacy for the 
coming district head elections under the abbreviated name "Lukman."
Six hundred people were put to work to organize this party. At lunch time, they served 
a meal for which eighteen cows, ten large pigs, a buffalo, and several goats were 
slaughtered, and which required four tons of rice, three hundred kilograms of sugar, 
and a large bag of areca nuts, and these exact amounts were carefully reported to the 
media and even reached the national newspaper, Kompas.57
53 Kuipers, Language, Identity, and Marginality in Indonesia, pp. 74-75.
54 Michael Dietler, "Rituals of Consumption, Commensal Politics and Power in an African Context," in 
Feasts: Archeological and Ethnographic Perspectives on Food, Politics and Power, ed. Michael Dietler and Brian 
Haydan (Washington, DC, and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), p. 67.
55 Brian Hayden, "Fabulous Feasts: A Prolegomenon to the Importance of Feasting," in Feasts: Archeological 
and Ethnographic Perspectives on Food, Politics and Power, ed. Michael Dietler and Brian Haydan 
(Washington, DC, and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), p. 30.
56 Waingapu has about 47,000 inhabitants, a quarter of the total population of East Sumba. See
http: / / www.sumbatimur.go.id/m od/kecam atan/doc/doc6_37kota_kependudukan.htm, accessed on 
June 6, 2005.
57 Kompas, April 30, 2005, http: / / www.kompas.com/kompas%2Dcetak/0504/30/pilkada/1721810.htm, 
accessed on June 2, 2005, and e-mail communication with Respati Dhani in Waingapu.
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The feast was a big success, and all seventeen thousand seats were occupied. The 
two first aspects or parts of this celebration resulted in a combination of a Christian 
ceremony, a display in New Order jargon of both hosts' fine records as bureaucrats, 
and a ritual that resembled the traditional house-cooling ceremony. The large crowd 
present and the excellent quality of the meals underlined the legitimacy of "Lukman" 
as leaders. The third part of the celebration, the official launching party of the 
"Lukman" candidacy, was then only the most logical end to the sequence, as it acted as 
a vehicle for the thousands of participants to issue a grassroots call for the successful 
pair to be their leaders in the future. The other candidates had already organized quite 
a few large gatherings where they always served a meal, but Lukas Kaborang's 
enormous feast had launched a competition in staging great feasts.
During the official election campaign, the General Election Committee set up a 
schedule to indicate where the four pairs of candidates could hold their election 
meetings, trying to avoid clashes between supporters. Popular assessment of the 
success of these meetings was first of all influenced by the number of people present. 
The size of the audience was measured by the number of plastic seats available and 
occupied, and the number of trucks and busses used to transport spectators to the site 
of the campaign event. In the reports I heard, no one spoke about which people were 
present; they just tallied up the size of the audience. In June, the campaign audience 
was referred to with the term "romantis," an abbreviation for rombongan makan gratis—a 
group that attends to get a free meal. Those referred to as romantis remained 
anonymous, were presumed to be weakly committed to the candidates whose events 
they enjoyed, and could easily attend another candidate's campaign meeting the next 
day in order to get another meal.
The quality of the meal was the second measure of success. At a premier 
Sumbanese feast, the host should slaughter buffaloes, pigs, and cattle, and make sure 
that there is plenty of rice and meat for everyone. At traditional feasts, areca and betel 
nuts, sirih pinang, should be served to welcome guests, and everyone present receives 
coffee. Election feasts, on the other hand, focused only on the meal, which can be 
interpreted as a sign that the feasts were only meant to be a display of the number of 
supporters, and not intended to create a relationship with those attending. When 
Pindingara and Refafi Gah held a campaign in Waingapu, however, the result was 
negative: a large number of seats were piled up, unoccupied, and the pair of 
candidates served nasi bungkus, pre-portioned and wrapped meals, which are a sign 
that the host can afford to buy food, but cannot mobilize enough labor to cook the food 
at public occasions. Moreover, the gathering was surrounded by young motorcyclists, 
who are commonly characterized as "gangsters from West Sumba," hired by the 
candidates to support the campaign and exert supportive violence if necessary.
Compared to his election campaign meetings, Lukas Kaborang's feast had a much 
more positive effect on his candidacy: the invitations he sent were crucial in his bid to 
create supportive relationships. On the down side, the fact that his campaign meetings 
were open to everyone did not appeal to Sumbanese of higher social status, who will 
only attend such events if they have been privately invited.
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The Result
The election took place on June 30, 2005. In the end, it turned out to be a very 
close race between the two big men, a race which Umbu Mehang won. Umbu 
Mehang won the elections with nearly 40 percent of the votes over about 34 
percent for Lukas Kaborang. The total results appear in the table below. All the 
pairs of candidates received a majority of votes in their respective areas of 
origin. The two main rivals each won in seven of the fifteen subdistricts, but the 
districts where Lukas Kaborang was favored were less populous. The right map 
below shows the area where Lukas Kaborang won in gray, whereas the black 
areas show Umbu Mehang's victories. Compared to the map at the left showing 
those areas where descendants of former kings could be expected to wield 
influence and had promised their support to Umbu Mehang, the only kingdom 
that did not keep its promise was the Umalulu area around Melolo (area 5 in the 
left map). That was the area where Alphonsius Anapaku grew up and received 
many votes; in the end, Lukas Kaborang received more votes there than Umbu 
Mehang.
Nearly sixteen thousand voters either did not cast a vote, were not able to 
vote, or had their vote declared invalid. Since the difference between Lukas 
Kaborang and Umbu Mehang was only about six thousand votes, the exact 
explanation for the absence, for whatever reason, of these sixteen thousand 
votes was extremely relevant. Lukas Kaborang immediately protested, claiming 
that the larger part of the sixteen thousand invalid and uncast votes had in fact 
been cast by his supporters, but fraudulently discarded, which would mean that 
he in fact won with 50 percent of the votes. Hundreds of people demonstrated 
before the General Election Committee on the July 4, 2005, accusing the 
committee of using unfair procedures that favored Umbu Mehang.
Map 2 (at left, for comparison)
Map 3 (at right) Shows Subdistricts Voting for 
Lukas Kaborang (gray) and Umbu Mehang (black)
7. Waijelu
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Table 1. Results of the District Head Elections in East Sumba, June 30, 200558









Drs. Lukas Mbadi Kaborang 














Dr. Alphonsius Anapaku 
Ir. Ignasius Kalukur Lidjang
PDI-P 10,665 9.85
valid votes 108,297 100.00
total number of voters 124,173
Conclusions
Pos Kupang's headline describing the election results in East Sumba ran: "In 
the End Golkar Wins on Sumba" (Akhirnya Golkar menang di Sumba).59 Although 
the campaign messages and voters' assessments were supposed to be focused on 
the personal characteristics and leadership potential of the respective 
candidates, it could be true that Golkar won the elections simply because it 
represented a powerful network of vested interests. In fact, since 1998, when the 
democratic reforms in Indonesia were initiated, voters' support for Golkar in 
elections concerning the district of East Sumba has been fairly constant, as 
shown in table 2, below.
Table 2. Voters' Support in East Sumba in the 1999 and 2004 District Assembly 
Elections and 2005 District Head Elections, Showing Percentage of Total60






Golkar 43 44 40






58 "Akhirnya Golkar menang di Sumba," Pos Kupang, July 2, 2005. See 
http:/ / www.indomedia.com/poskup/2 0 0 5 /0 7 /0 2 /edisi02/0207utal.htm
59 Ibid.
60 Source: BPS East Sumba, 2003, p. 45. Sabana 56, May 2004.
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Support for the other parties was not constant at all. One can generally 
conclude that the Golkar candidate can count on 40 percent of the votes, while 
the opposition candidates will have to divide up the rest. Because opposition is 
divided among so many parties, the Golkar candidate wins.
Nearly all the Sumbanese elite were members of Golkar until 1998. Those who 
shifted to other political parties since then had private reasons for doing so. Changing 
to another party mostly involved a decision to leave Golkar, indicating that the 
potential candidate hoped a new party would be more beneficial to his career. People 
who already held powerful strategic positions had no reason to leave Golkar. Again, 
Golkar was and is essentially a network of the vested interests. The other parties are 
vehicles for the opposition, consisting of those who are either frustrated by the current 
power holders, or those who cannot fulfill their ambitions through a regular 
bureaucratic career and Golkar.
Golkar candidate Umbu Mehang relied on strong supportive networks as his 
strategy to win the elections. Golkar itself functions as a well organized and elaborate 
network of people in leading positions who can exert power over their own 
subordinates. In West Sumba, the Golkar candidate also won. This candidate, Pote 
Leba, who was the incumbent deputy district head, received 32 percent of the votes. 
This result in the adjacent district supports the thesis that Golkar wins the elections 
thanks to its network of vested interests; it does not support the thesis that the 
incumbent bupati wins because of his position.
In East Sumba's pilkada of 2005, the opposition relied on various strategies to 
convince the audience of the candidate's legitimacy as a leader. Lukas Kaborang 
excelled in rhetoric, theatre, and the staging of feasts, and he could highlight the 
excellent reputation he had earned as district head in the previous period, 1995-1999. 
Although he did not win, many people—34 percent—voted for him; this can be 
interpreted as a vote for their own direct interests as farmers and small businesspeople 
who have limited access to the state bureaucracy.
Whether "money politics" played a role in the district head elections in East Sumba 
is hard to determine. All candidates depended on the assistance of businessmen, some 
of whom were openly supporting one candidate, whereas the majority were active 
behind the scenes and sometimes contributed to various candidates. Umbu Mehang 
gained a reputation for strategically supporting social events, such as funerals and also 
church meetings, by providing money or livestock. Lukas Kaborang used his large 
feast to create reciprocal obligations, but the feasts during the official campaign period 
were too anonymous to create social relations. These feasts were intended to enhance 
the candidate's fame based on the size of the audience and to buy the votes of poorer 
people by providing a free meal.
In an election system where only political parties can propose candidates, and 
where only a limited number of viable potential candidates happen to be available, a 
market develops in which "money politics" become important. Candidates in the 2005 
pilkada on East Sumba required funds, and so they were all involved in "money 
politics" to some degree. The position of district head has become a very attractive and 
powerful bureaucratic post since the election reforms, so that candidates for the post 
can attract investors who hope to profit from their loyalty in the future. The
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commenter in Pos Kupang who reported that it has become common for candidates to 
describe the bribes they pay to a political party as "political costs," a euphemism 
suggesting that these are standard political transactions, illustrates the blurred line 
between legal and illegal activities.61
The strong position of political parties in the initial phase of the election process 
and the involvement of local investors in the business of district politics are new 
elements of Indonesian democracy. How these investors will be rewarded after the 
elections is a subject for more research during the coming years.
61 Max Regus, "Pilkada, kapitalisasi politik dan banditisasi kekuasaan" (Regional head elections and the 
capitalization and criminalization of power), Pos Kupang, April 15, 2005. See
http: / / www.indomedia.com/ poskup/ 2005/ 04/15/  edisil5/ 1504pinl.htm, accessed on May 25, 2005.
